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Abstract 
Agricultural growth has been largely responsible for India’s desire for long term 
food security for its rapidly growing population and making food affordable by 
price stabilization. It is therefore a big challenge for the policy makers to make 
policies which enable farmers to efficiently adjust to a less regulated 
production and marketing environment. Lack of an effective competition policy 
regime in India, has constrained the farm sector gains from trade reforms, and 
farmer’s capacity to adopt new technologies. Thus, well thought agricultural 
policy reforms are essential to enhance the agricultural sectoral productivity in 
India. The current paper is an attempt to understand the various regulatory 
provisions and subsidies which affect the production and trade of rice the most 
important food crop in India and the world. 
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Since the mid sixties India saw the beginning of the green revolution in it’s agricultural sector 
which witnessed rapid growth, facilitated by policy support, new production technologies and 
public investment in irrigation infrastructure in terms of several large irrigation projects. 
Agricultural growth has been largely responsible for India’s desire for long term food security for 
its rapidly growing population and making food affordable by price stabilization. It is therefore a 
big challenge for the policy makers to make policies which enable farmers to efficiently adjust to 
a less regulated production and marketing environment. However, lack of an effective 
competition policy regime in India, has constrained the farm sector gains from trade reforms, 
and farmer’s capacity to adopt new technologies. Thus, well thought agricultural policy reforms 
are essential to enhance the agricultural sectoral productivity in India. 
Agricultural Policy and Administered Prices in India 
The advent of the green revolution in the mid-1960s marked a turning point in the technological 
"upgrading" of Indian agriculture. The agricultural research and extension system received 
special attention during this period since Mexican wheat and International Rice Research 
Institute (IRRI) rice varieties had to be adapted to Indian conditions and made acceptable to 
farmers through extension and training. 
Initially, new technology was confined to wheat production in the north-western states of India. 
In the early 1970s, however, new varieties of rice were successfully introduced and the rice 
revolution spread not only in Punjab and Haryana but also to many other parts of India 
including the southern coastal areas. The focus of agricultural policy became the modernization 
of agriculture through extending seed-fertilizer technology to different parts of the country. 
Measures were also taken to involve small and marginal farmers in the production process by 
providing them with new inputs, including seeds, fertilizers aRd credit at subsidized rates. 
Administered prices were the third area of policy during the planning era. In the context of 
pervading food shortages up until the mid-1950s, agricultural price policy had aimed at serving 
the main planning objective of keeping foodgrain prices low in the interest of food security. With 
the founding of the Agricultural Price Commission in 1965, price policy also provided incentives 
to farmers to increase production by establishing remunerative prices and assuring minimum 
support prices. The objective of the price policy was to reconcile two opposing interests - that of 
the farmers for fair remuneration and that of the consumers for reasonable prices. 
The fourth important component of policy was the establishment of a comprehensive 
management system for the procurement, storage and public distribution of foodgrains to 
provide food to consumers at reasonable prices. During periods of scarcity, minimum support 
and procurement price operations were combined with compulsory procurement, levies on 
millers, zonal restrictions and other measures to enable the distribution of foodgrains (at 
subsidized rates) through the public distribution system (PDS). Sufficient food stocks were kept 
for running the PDS and also to help to stabilize prices through open market operations. 
The fifth component was tightly controlled trade and exchange rate policies. In the case of 
agriculture, except for a few traditional commercial crops, the sector was insulated from world 
markets through the almost total control of exports and imports. The estimated surplus over 
domestic consumption requirements determined the quantities to be exported and vice versa for 
imports. Foodgrains, sugar and edible oils were imported in times of scarcity to prevent 
domestic prices of essential commodities from rising and to impart a measure of stability to 
domestic prices in the interest of both producers and consumers. Foreign trade in most 
agricultural goods was subject to quota or other restrictions such as minimum price 
requirements. 
Finally, financial policy attempted to mobilize resources for public sector expenditure and for 
public investment. A system was created to extend cooperative and institutional credit to the 
rural sector, thus facilitating private investment in infrastructure and encouraging the adoption 
of new technology. 
A review of the past performance and policies of India’s foodgrain sector reveals that the main 
drivers of growth have been modern inputs and technology, institutions, and markets with the 
changing role of the public and private sectors. The present challenge facing Indian 
policymakers is to efficiently balance food security concerns and higher growth objectives. This 
will require not only pushing the production frontier to sustainably augment supply, but also 
ensuring strategic management of foodgrains including procurement and distribution.  
The review of input policies highlights the pressure placed on foodgrain systems, in a business-
as-usual scenario that extensively subsidizes input and promotes their intensive usage. Fallouts 
such as excessive groundwater withdrawals and distorted application of nitrogenous fertilizers 
have implications on the environmental sustainability of natural resources apart from being a 
considerable fiscal burden. The current policy of subsidizing agricultural power, irrigation, and 
fertilizers has outlived its relevance and is actually constraining agricultural investments in areas 
where the returns are higher. Although it is difficult to completely remove these subsidies, they 
still need to be gradually phased out and converted into investments in rural infrastructure 
(especially roads) and research and extension systems, which desperately need to be 
(re)vitalized. It is time the government started to actively partner with the private sector (in 
infrastructure creation and research) and civil society organizations (in extension), as they have 
played an increasingly important role in recent years.  
The review of the output management policies show that the current policy paradigm consisting 
of public procurement of grains at a pre-announced minimum support price, public storage, and 
public distribution has resulted in distortions across crops, especially rice and wheat, as well 
periodic build-up of large stockpiles and stock rundown of these grains at a high cost to the 
government. Moreover, public procurement and stocking, coupled with interventionist 
international trade policies, is often at variance with the trends in international markets, 
resulting in lost opportunities for Indian exporters of rice and wheat. The regional concentration 
of the system of public procurement in the northern states, aided by intra-country trade and 
movement restrictions, has also resulted in large spatial disparity in agricultural productivity and 
farm income as well as uneven development of output markets across states. As a result, 
producer and consumer welfare is often compromised, even though the government’s objective 
is to maintain a balance between them. Major reforms on the output side would include linking 
of MSPs with market prices, allowing futures markets in cereals, liberalizing international trade 
and bring forth greater competition in domestic trade to ensure output markets are more 
uniformly developed across states and that the country has a truly integrated market for 
foodgrains. 
The activities of the Food Corporation of India (FCI) and India’s statutory wholesale marketing 
arrangements (Agricultural Produce Marketing Committees) were, on prima facie grounds, 
considered to be having major impacts on competition and price transmission to the farm level. 
The likely extent of those impacts was considered sufficient to warrant in-depth, quantitative, 
analysis of efficiency losses associated with FCI activities, such as their stockpiling and 
procurement arrangements (including minimum support prices to farmers in certain locations). 
The analysis also included an assessment of the appropriateness and compatibility of the FCI’s 
various public policy objectives and identified alternative, less competition restricting, policy 
options for meeting those objectives. 
A study by NCAER found that the exiting system of controls on agricultural markets have not 
served the purpose of enhancing competition among market intermediaries. Lack of market 
incentives has also impeded the development of agricultural infrastructure and regulatory 
restrictions and controls apply to rice processing in almost all the major states. Inefficient supply 
chains are also resulting in high levels of wastage in food grains and horticulture crops. 
Market orientated reforms, however, necessarily involve progressively decoupling agricultural 
assistance from farm input and output prices and the associated quantities. Significant efforts 
are required by government, however, to tailor such changes to the specific circumstances of 
each country. 
A clear message from policy developments in both developed and emerging economies is that 
policy reform and the ‘openness’ of economies hold the key to productivity gains, rather than 
having governments attempting to 'drive' growth through subsidised agricultural input and 
output prices. 
A related concern is the continuing focus of some governments on establishing ‘growth targets’ 
as the centrepiece of rural policy. This experience highlights the need for governments to also 
be ensuring that food security and rural income goals are achieved in the most efficient manner 
so that national resources and limited government funds can be efficiently utilized. Pursuing 
output and growth targets, without regard to the economic, social and environmental costs of 
achieving them, has been demonstrated to be a waste of national resources and ultimately 
incompatible with the goal of achieving food security and increasing rural incomes in a 
sustainable manner. Government policies must be redirected toward increasing market 
efficiency and correcting market failures, such as poverty alleviation. 
In the case of India, given the current status of agriculture and the rural sector, the challenge is 
therefore to make this transition without placing in jeopardy the food and income surety of 
vulnerable groups including marginal and small farmers. This calls for a well thought out 
strategy for gradually, but not unduly slowly, transforming Indian agriculture and establishing a 
policy environment that can provide rural producers with the flexibility to face the challenges of 
a fast growing modern economy. 
Development in agricultural R&D staff  
The allocation of research budget towards salaries, operating cost and capital costs influence 
the efficiency of agriculture Research &Development, e.g. during 2001-2003 ICAR spent 50 per 
cent on salaries, 35 per cent on operating costs and 15 per cent on capital investment, but in 
SAUs 67, 20 and 13 per cent of the expenditure goes towards salary, operational cost and 
capital cost in 2003, respectively. The allocation of research budget on several of research 
programmes is policy decision and reflects priorities for research. In last 5 years ending with 
2009, even with the positive trend in public agricultural R&D in India, the staffing in agricultural  
R&D has shown declining trend due to  stagnation in recruitment  and enhancement in salaries . 
However, among the research institute ICAR spent about 50 per cent in crop research while 
SAU spent 85 per cent in crop and livestock research. 
Private investment in agricultural R&D 
To encourage the private sector involvement in agricultural technology development, India has 
strengthened its IPR regimes in harmonization with international agreements. IPR guidelines by 
ICAR will geared to stimulate innovation by sharing research benefits with innovations. It was 
fostering the partnerships with the private sector for the scaling up and commercialization of 
technologies developed in the private sector. Private investment in agricultural R&D was 
relatively low until 2000. Growing world population, global food demand and the lack of 
extensive factors of production push food and agriculture producers to find a new ways to 
increase output. According to USDA, private agriculture research and development (R&D) 
expenditures, increased from $6.9 billion in 2000 to $11 billion in 2010. R&D expenditures on 
crop improvement & biotechnology, crop protection and farm machinery account for about 85% 
of total private R&D expenditures in the world.  
Subsidies in Indian Agriculture 
The Indian Government provides free electricity (in some states like Punjab and Tamil Nadu) to 
the farmers along with subsidized water, seeds, chemical inputs and transport. It also 
guarantees purchase by the government of all most of the wheat and rice produced in selected 
states. This agricultural regime has certainly resulted in increased agricultural production; 
however, the extent of government intervention has impeded the development of functioning 
markets. The result is that inefficiencies and degradation now threaten India’s long term 
economic sustainability and agricultural productivity. Liberalisation measures implemented 
across other sectors of India’s economy, have failed to extend to agriculture. Table-2, gives an 
idea about the amount of subsidies provided to agricultural sector by the Govt. of India over the 
years under different heads. 
Table-2: Agricultural Subsidies in India during 1993-94 to 2000-01 
Year  Agricultural Subsidies (Rs. Crore) 
 Fertilizer Electricity Irrigation* Others Total 
1993-94 4562 2400 5872 1235 14069 
1994-95 5769 2338 6772 1246 16125 
1995-96 6735 1977 7931 1034 17677 
1996-97 7578 8356 9221 895 26050 
1997-98 9918 4937 10318 983 26156 
1998-99 11596 3819 11827 1182 28424 
1999-2000 13244 4276 11487 1937 30944 
2000-2001 13800 6449 13681 854 34784 
* Includes imputed subsidies of irrigation 
Source- Central Statistical Organization, New Delhi 
 
Agricultural input subsidies and the Green Revolution prevented famine in many parts of India. 
However, India continues to experience a high rate of malnutrition, owing to poverty, 
inefficiencies and corruption in management of cereals supply chains. Growth in grain yields has 
not matched with an increased demand, nor has it resulted in efficient input usage. Farmers do 
not have the incentive to improve input productivity and have thus become dependent on the 
subsidies to sustain their production and incomes. 
As India’s demand for food continues to grow, the subsidy bill is also expected to grow 
substantially. The current level of government spending on the system is unlikely to be 
maintained, as the net loss generated is leading to persistent deficits. If the funds are not 
creating a sustainable agricultural system, they are an inefficient allocation of public resources. 
Greater efficiency could be attained by allowing a market-based input supply chain for 
agricultural inputs to operate, but the current policy mechanism inhibits the development of a 
functioning market and the cost to poor smallholders would be disastrous. 
Effects of Subsidies on Indian Agriculture  
The subsidy system has resulted in misallocation of resources, which may reduce India’s ability 
to meet its future food demand. Current growth in food demand is predominantly for vegetable 
and meat products, associated with the changing consumption patterns of the growing middle 
class. Demand for grain products is declining. The current policy regime is not suited to this 
change and is incapable of adapting. Rice and wheat crops account for three quarters of 
agricultural land area and 85 per cent of the gross value of crop output. Although there is now a 
surplus of these crops, farmers have no incentive to diversify so long as the purchase of these 
crops is guaranteed. To ensure India’s long term food security, current policies must be adapted 
to allow producers to respond to changing market demands. 
Subsidies also result in detrimental environmental impacts due to resource overuse, as farmers 
have no incentive to use freely available resources efficiently. Notably, groundwater extraction is 
occurring at more than double the recharge rate. Furthermore, as water resources are depleted, 
farmers respond by installing deeper wells that use more electricity, compounding the existing 
electricity overuse problem. This over-extraction is a key factor driving India’s severe and 
worsening water security situation. Other adverse environmental impacts are associated with 
the overuse of chemical inputs, leading to soil degradation, nutrient imbalance, and losses in 
ecosystem services and biodiversity. While the subsidies have resulted in increased yields, policy 
change is needed to create incentives for farmers to adopt more efficient practices, to prevent 
further degradation and promote efficient input usage. 
The strategic implications of this policy regime for India are significant. For example, there is 
some possibility of tension with neighbours such as Pakistan, primarily associated with the 
differential costs of production causing tension between farmers.There is also the potential for 
more serious, long-term conflict over shared water resources, should current usage practices 
cause them to become scarce. 
The difficulty is that internal instability, in the form of social unrest, could be widespread if 
dramatic policy changes are attempted, as farmers make up half of India’s population and thus 
exert considerable political pressure. Policy changes would be extremely unpopular among 
farmers, who rely on the subsidies as a form of income support. It is therefore necessary that 
any policy change is carefully designed, so as to encourage innovation in a way that farmers 
perceive will benefit them. Removal of the subsidies without compensation would harm 
household food security. To achieve subsidy reform without provoking unrest, will require 
changes that involve multiple policy mechanisms, including extension, education and incentives. 
While adaptation is likely to be a challenging and complicated process, it is crucial. Continuation 
of the current policies will be detrimental to India’s food security, welfare and, in the long-term, 
economic growth. 
Why subsidize Indian Agriculture? 
The major question in front of the policy- makers and economists these days is that that do we 
really need subsidies? For this, one needs to look into the negative effects of subsidies which 
are far more than the positive effects. Once received, people become dependent on the 
subsidies. Subsidies make the beneficiaries lethargic. Hence, subsidies are sometimes termed as 
sweet poison. Misuse of subsidies for political purpose is known worldwide. Subsidies support 
one industry at the expense of the other. When a person is given subsidy benefit, it imposes 
burden on some other person in the country. Malpractices have often been noticed in the 
administration of subsidies. 
The whole issue of subsidies cannot be seen in isolation of today’s politics. The whole issue of 
subsidies is an economic as well as a political issue. The subsidy policies in India are being 
advocated by those same policy makers who appear in public as pro-poor, but are driven by the 
political implications of their actions. In India, the politicians lack the courage to privatize the 
huge, loss-making public sector because they are afraid to lose the organized labour vote. They 
resist dismantling subsidies for power, fertilizers and water because they fear the crucial farm 
vote. They don’t even think of touching food subsidies because of the massive poor vote. The 
politicians create their elections agenda out of the subsidies and corner the real meaning and 
use of subsidies. Increases in subsidies will only result in keeping the political constituents 
happy and lead to a bulging fiscal deficit – without benefiting the intended beneficiaries. 
One who advocates subsidies should also keep in mind one thing that the subsidies in India 
never reach their intended target i.e. the poor. The fact is, in India, most subsidies are not for 
the poor but for the rich. Despite of the continuously rising food subsidies, hunger and 
malnutrition prevails in the entire county. Due to faulty government practices, people who are in 
the real need of subsidies- even for their sheer survival are being forced out of the system. 
Even the fertilizer subsidy in India reveals the same dismal picture. Fertilizer subsidy places 
another heavy burden on the central government. It is a very well known fact that the subsidy 
benefits majorly goes to the fertilizer industry and not the farmers. Only 60 per cent of fertiliser 
subsidy goes to farmers. If we take a look at the fertilizer subsidy and its origin, then we will 
come to know that the original purpose of the fertilizer subsidy was to encourage spread of 
green revolution technology to new areas and farmers but this reason and motive has lost its 
credibility in the recent years. 
Here regarding the fertilizer subsidy, one should also keep in mind that the availability of 
subsidised fertiliser should be restricted to farmers who grow staple food and cereals as they 
need it the most and those farmers, who produce cash crops, do extensive horticulture or 
produce farm goods for direct exports should be kept outside the purview of subsidy regime. 
The most alarming aspect of the surging subsidies is not the size, but the manner and purpose 
of spending on them. Subsidies provided in India suffer from both inclusion error (wrong kind of 
people benefiting) and exclusion error (deserving people left out of subsidies). Efficient 
subsidies must be transparent, targeted and-in many cases-temporary. These three Ts are 
missing from most subsidies in India. 
The issue is not about removing subsidies but about how to make them effective so that they 
reach the target consumers and people are benefited from it. The policy- makers should try out 
new- mechanisms to reach the target consumers more effectively. Sometimes government 
subsidises some things but those things might not be affordable by the target audience, so 
there is need for restructuring of subsidies. 
Now the time has now come to work on building a political and national consensus on the 
subsidy issue. It is important that we restructure subsidies so that only the really needy and the 
poor benefit from them and all leakages are plugged. All subsidies should be targeted sharply at 
the poor and the truly needy like small and marginal farmers, farm labour and urban poor. 
Reforms can only be made in the subsidy system when the policy- makers, politicians and 
economists will understand that the question is not whether to subsidise or not, but who to 
subsidise and how. 
Thus some measures for effective utilization of subsidies can be: 
1. The focus should be on physical achievements and not on financial disbursements. 
2. The effects of subsidies should be monitorable and measurable in terms of quality or quantity. 
3. Subsidies should be given as a one- time help or for a short period. Subsidies on continuing 
basis should be avoided. 
4. The parameters fixed on subsidy should be transparent. 
5. Subsidies should be cost- effective. Most of the assistance should reach the intended 
beneficiary and very small amount should be spent on administrative arrangements. 
6. Subsidies should be properly targeted, i.e. benefit should go to the really deserving. 
7. Timing of subsidies should be made proper. For example, free seed distribution should be 
just before sowing. 
Agricultural supply chains in India are subject to numerous forms of regulatory intervention by 
government, such as input subsidies, APMC markets and the activities of the Food Corporation 
of India. These interventions are generally inefficient in meeting their stated public policy 
objectives and therefore unnecessarily restrict competition and significantly distort price signals 
through to the farm level. This is having the effect of maintaining certain farm production 
patterns and hence, impeding farm adjustment into the production of commodities where India 
has a comparative production advantage. 
The response by government to declining yields and resource degradation has been ongoing 
increases in input and output subsidies. This has resulted in marginal yield gains now being 
achieved at very high levels of inputs and hence sectoral productivity is entering a declining 
phase with associated adverse implications for regional incomes and poverty. 
While this situation can only be arrested with significant agricultural policy reform and sectoral 
adjustment, there are important and fundamental implications for the focus of technical farm 
level research. Much technical research into crop yields is arguably aimed at addressing 
‘symptoms’ rather than ‘causes’, and is therefore likely to be having the effect of reducing the 
pressures on government to progress policy reform. It would therefore be imperative to re-
consider the merit of technical research where it relates to regulated production systems 
characterised by subsidised input and output prices. 
 
 What needs to be done now? 
Important underpinning public policy principles drawn from contemporary international 
experience are that (a) public policy objectives should be closely aligned with addressing 
significant and accepted forms of ‘market failure’ and (b) the form of intervention should be that 
which meets the objective and which imposes the least restriction on competition. The 
assessments are to be based on contemporary public policy principles and the extent to which 
traditional industry policy settings were being replaced with trade practices law.  Further, 
studies are needed on actual agricultural policy settings in India which consider the merit of 
policy objectives and the means by which governments were endeavouring to achieve them. 
Economic Rationale 
India recurrently faces food price inflation and declining agricultural productivity. Such studies 
could provide a rational approach to agricultural policy reform and identifying specific reform 
options in relation to the Food Corporation of India, and the Indian Government can initiate 
suitable reforms through agencies such as the Competition Commission of India. 
It also essential to have better and more efficient price signals to flow through to the farm 
sector, both immediately and over the next five years that will stimulate farm level adjustment 
and higher farm incomes. Further work is required, to closely and transparently monitor 
agricultural incomes and productivity, and the effects of agricultural policy reform on those 
sectoral performance measures. 
Regulatory impediments to the inter-sectoral adjustment of capital and labour also need close, 
ongoing, consideration and need to be subject to the same competition disciplines as has been 
proposed in the project for the agricultural sector. 
Farm level adjustment in response to policy reform will impose adjustment costs on farm 
families requiring further consideration of adjustment assistance by government. Broader public 
benefits in the form of enhanced public and private investment in food production and 
associated services will however be the result along with more affordable food prices. 
International commodity trade and food security will potentially be enhanced. 
Social impacts 
Agricultural policy based on subsidised input and output prices inevitably leads to lower farm 
incomes, over exploitation of the natural resource base and increasing public sector debt. Not 
only does this result in poor social outcomes for the agricultural sector, but the capacity of 
government to fund the provision of other public services, such as health and infrastructure is 
reduced, thus reducing the social well-being of the community generally. 
Agricultural policy reform as outlined in the previous sections necessarily has its impacts over an 
extended time horizon, rather than immediately. While farm and community level policy reform 
may in the short term impose significant adjustment costs on highly assisted industries, 
ultimately, more sustainable employment opportunities within agriculture and other sectors of 
the Indian economy will result in much improved social living standards. 
Policy Options 
Recognising that policy reform is the domain of the Indian Government, the following policy 
options are may be put forward for consideration based on the project analyses: 
1. That the Indian Government, with the Competition Commission of India, moves to adopt a 
‘market failure’ based policy framework to guide agricultural policy reform. 
2. Key components of that framework include: 
 A transparent legislation/regulation review process, whereby agricultural regulation that 
significantly influences competition and food chain prices is subject to an independent, 
rolling, 5 year review process; 
 As part of a broader agricultural policy reform program, government objectives need to 
increasingly focus on facilitating efficient input and output markets with necessary 
targeted assistance and safeguards for vulnerable groups; 
 Regular monitoring and surveying of the farm sector to enable a sound understanding of 
developments in farm incomes and productivity in response to the government’s policy 
reform agenda, to be shared with key stakeholders; and 
 The strategic application of competition law. 
3. Analysis of alternative mechanisms for meeting the current government objectives pursued 
through FCI operations indicates that current problems with wasteful levels of stocks and 
denial of food to needy consumers can be minimised by:  
 addressing the FCI’s food security objective through the introduction of targeted 
programs which effectively meet those food security objectives in relation to the rural 
and urban poor, such as a food stamp program; 
 addressing the FCI’s farm income objective through alternative arrangements, such as a 
guaranteed price deficiency payment scheme; 
 Requiring the FCI to focus on the management of the buffer stock. 
4. Given that much information already exists in relation to the adverse effects of agricultural 
policy involving the provision of government assistance through input and output prices, 
early reform priority be placed on: 
 Improving the ability of rural labour and farm families to adopt more efficient farm 
practices and to move into other sectors of the economy; and 
 Implementing an orderly transition program from currently provided input subsidies to 
new farm programs which focus on more appropriate measures of productivity and the 
market failure issues typically associated with agricultural production systems. 
Developments in the rice sector 
The Indian government implemented several policies to boost rice production. Numerous 
subsidies, ranging from fertilizer to irrigation, electricity, seeds, machinery, and food, are 
available. The government subsidizes agricultural inputs to keep farm costs low and increase 
production. Irrigation and electricity are supplied directly to farmers at below production costs. 
The subsidy rate for pump sets, seed drills, rotavators, knapsack sprayers, power weeders, and 
transplanters is 50%. Power tillers are distributed at 25% subsidy to a maximum of $989. In 
April 2010, a new nutrient-based subsidy scheme was implemented in which farmers are given 
incentives to use a better mix of nutrients. It provided a subsidy on nutrient nitrogen (N), 
phosphorus (P), potash (K), and sulfur (S) contents for 2010-11. 
There is also an additional subsidy on fertilizers carrying other secondary nutrients and 
micronutrients. Around 120 million farmers rely on this fertilizer subsidy. Since 2005-06, India’s 
Ministry of Agriculture has been implementing the Production and Distribution of Quality Seeds 
Scheme with the target of ensuring timely availability of quality seeds of various crops at 
affordable prices. 
Through the Food Corporation of India (FCI), the government implements price policy through 
procurement and public distribution operations. The agency buys rough rice and milled rice for 
which a minimum support price is announced well before the commencement of the Rabi and 
Kharif seasons. They buy paddy rice directly from farmers and maintain huge rice stocks at all 
times. These stocks are then subsidized by the government and distributed to poorer 
communities across the country. 
On the trading side, commitments on rice import tariffs under the Uruguay Round Agreements 
Act (URAA) for India are bound at 0% since 2009 up until the first quarter of 2012. The 
government imposed a total ban on exports of nonbasmati rice in October 2008, partially lifted 
it in April 2011, and removed the ban in September 2011. 
Electricity Subsidy to rice farmers 
In India, electricity subsidies enabled agricultural users to access electricity at prices below the 
marginal cost of supply, thereby lowering the cost of irrigation and groundwater extraction, an 
essential input in agricultural production. These electricity subsidies may also generate 
economic inefficiencies. They may distort decisions over electricity consumption and 
groundwater extraction and induce individuals to grow more water intensive crops. Given the 
size of electricity subsidies for agriculture in India as well as in other developing countries, the 
economic consequences of this poverty alleviation strategy may be large. 
Evidences suggest that these subsidies are not without their benefits. The expansion and uptake 
of tube wells for irrigation was largely expedited by subsidized electricity prices, which reduced 
the price of groundwater extraction. In turn, this growth in irrigation increased agricultural 
yields, lowered food prices, increased demand for agricultural labour and disproportionately 
benefited landless farmers. In India, state governments are authorized to set electricity prices, 
therefore electricity prices vary across states. There is also substantial heterogeneity in prices 
across time; this occurs because states respond to economic and political pressures by changing 
agricultural electricity subsidies. 
Electricity subsidies have resulted in an increased groundwater extraction and agricultural 
revenues. It has been reported that a 25 percent increase in electricity prices generates a 1.6 
percent decrease in groundwater extraction and a 5 percent reduction in agricultural revenues, 
where this reduction in revenues is partly driven by a reduction in crop production. Production 
of water intensive crops, along both the intensive and extensive margins, increases in response 
to a reduction in electricity prices. 
Agricultural Policy Reforms – Strategic Directions for India 
The comparative study of the agricultural experience in the BRICs countries provides significant 
evidence that a range of market orientated agricultural policy reforms can lead to higher rural 
incomes, increased agricultural productivity and reduced poverty. Market orientated reforms, 
however, necessarily involve progressively decoupling agricultural assistance from farm input 
and output prices and the associated quantities. Significant efforts are required by government, 
however, to tailor such changes to the specific circumstances of each country. 
A clear message from policy developments in both developed and emerging economies is that 
policy reform and the ‘openness’ of economies hold the key to productivity gains, rather than 
having governments attempting to 'drive' growth through subsidised agricultural input and 
output prices. 
A related concern is the continuing focus of some governments on establishing ‘growth targets’ 
as the centrepiece of rural policy. This experience highlights the need for governments to also 
be ensuring that food security and rural income goals are achieved in the most efficient manner 
so that national resources and limited government funds can be efficiently utilized. Pursuing 
output and growth targets, without regard to the economic, social and environmental costs of 
achieving them, has been demonstrated to be a waste of national resources and ultimately 
incompatible with the goal of achieving food security and increasing rural incomes in a 
sustainable manner. Government policies must be redirected toward increasing market 
efficiency and correcting market failures, such as poverty alleviation. 
In the case of India, given the current status of agriculture and the rural sector, the challenge is 
therefore to make this transition without placing in jeopardy the food and income surety of 
vulnerable groups including marginal and small farmers. This calls for a well thought out 
strategy for gradually, but not unduly slowly, transforming Indian agriculture and establishing a 
policy environment that can provide rural producers with the flexibility to face the challenges of 
a fast growing modern economy. 
More generally, the focus of government needs to shift from effectively acting as a market 
operative, through efforts aimed at directly influencing farm prices, to one of facilitating the 
development of more efficient markets, with appropriately targeted safety nets and adjustment 
assistance. 
The Indian experience shows that: 
 Food security can be addressed more efficiently through direct income support programs 
directed at the poor, than through large scale government food stockpiling and 
distribution which goes beyond the maintenance of stocks needed for emergency food 
security needs. However, where such arrangements are maintained, the potential 
benefits of commercialisation should be evaluated; 
 Farm income support delivered directly through farm input and output prices leads to 
unintended and inefficient resource use distortions, and by delivering most benefits to 
better off farmers and processors, it is not only regressive but also ineffective in targeting 
support to those most in need; and 
 Once programs are in place that effectively target the poor and disadvantaged, 
governments need to consider whether their price stabilisation and risk management 
objectives can be more efficiently addressed at the farm and industry level through 
strategies such as production diversification, off-farm income and private marketing 
options such as forward contracts. 
A truism is that market based policy reforms are inevitable in response to changing supply and 
demand conditions and the need for economies to maintain global competitiveness. 
Nevertheless, they are often politically sensitive and need to occur in an orderly manner that 
engages with key stakeholders and the broader community. 
Hence there is a strong case, particularly for emerging economies, to introduce public 
institutions and associated regulatory review processes that enable transparent and ongoing 
scrutiny of agricultural policy settings, with review processes complemented by: 
 The regular monitoring by government of farm incomes and sectoral productivity to 
assess the impacts of reform; and 
 An ongoing program of independent public policy research aimed at enhancing the 
welfare and productivity dividends of the government’s regulatory portfolio. 
A major concern for India is that the traditional forms of agricultural policy, such as the FCI, its 
food grain procurement arrangements, APMC markets, minimum support prices and input 
subsidies, have created an incentive system throughout India’s food supply chains which 
maintains certain ‘historical’ production patterns, and in so doing, limits agricultural sector 
adjustment which would otherwise enhance sectoral incomes, productivity and food security. 
The unintended impacts of these arrangements, such as their contribution to food price inflation 
and decelerating total factor productivity, are also now becoming more evident. They may also 
be acting as a disincentive to farmer participation in new programs and to private sector and 
foreign investment in areas such as infrastructure provision. 
Importantly, they also incur significant budgetary costs that impede the capacity of government 
to otherwise assist farm families and communities through the introduction of new government 
adjustment programs. 
In this context, the productivity of India’s agricultural sector needs to be re-considered with a 
focus on total factor productivity, as defined by the relationship between inputs and outputs, 
rather than on ‘partial’ productivity measures, such as crop yields. 
The current emphasis of government assistance on subsidising prices, needs to shift to focus on 
those forms of market failure typically associated with farming systems, such as information 
failure with respect to the development and adoption of new technology, credit markets and the 
introduction of industry and government partnership arrangements aimed at facilitating more 
efficient levels of investment in environmental management, food safety, bio-security and 
infrastructure provision. 
Given the focus of the recently constituted Competition Commission of India on ensuring fair 
and healthy competition in the economy to achieve efficient resource use and faster and 
inclusive growth and development, it follows that it has an important role in considering the 
application of trade practices law to agriculture as part of India’s new ‘agricultural policy 
program’. This will help ensure that the gains from reform are efficiently and equitably 
distributed among supply chain participants consistent with national goals. Important areas of 
focus will be (i) ‘unconscionable conduct’ and ‘market power abuse’, rather than on differences 
per se in market power between buyers and sellers, and (ii) farm level arrangements that 
provide for collective bargaining. 
Policy Options for Indian Agricultural Sector 
Recognising that policy reform is the domain of the Indian Government, the following policy 
options may be considered based on above discussion: 
1. That the Indian Government, with the Competition Commission of India, could move to 
adopt a ‘market failure’ based policy framework to guide agricultural policy reform. 
2. Key components of that framework include: 
 a transparent legislation/regulation review process, whereby agricultural regulation that 
significantly influences competition and food chain prices is subject to an independent, 
rolling, 5 year review process; 
 as part of a broader agricultural policy reform program, government objectives need to 
increasingly focus on facilitating efficient input and output markets with necessary 
targeted assistance and safeguards for vulnerable groups; 
 regular monitoring and surveying of the farm sector to enable a sound understanding of 
developments in farm incomes and productivity in response to the government’s policy 
reform agenda, to be shared with key stakeholders; and  
 the strategic application of competition law. 
3. Analysis of alternative mechanisms for meeting the current government objectives pursued 
through FCI operations indicates that current problems with wasteful levels of stocks and 
denial of food to needy consumers can be minimised by:  
 Addressing the FCI’s food security objective through the introduction of targeted 
programs which effectively meet those food security objectives in relation to the rural 
and urban poor, such as a food stamp program; 
 Addressing the FCI’s farm income objective through alternative arrangements, such as a 
guaranteed price deficiency payment scheme; 
 Requiring the FCI to focus on the management of the buffer stock. 
4. Given that much information already exists in relation to the adverse effects of agricultural 
policy involving the provision of government assistance through input and output prices, 
early reform priority be placed on: 
 Improving the ability of rural labour and farm families to adopt more efficient farm 
practices and to move into other sectors of the economy; and 
 Implementing an orderly transition program from currently provided input subsidies to 
new farm programs which focus on more appropriate measures of productivity and the 
market failure issues typically associated with agricultural production systems. 
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